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THE PATENT LAWYER’S GUIDE TO FASCISM
ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND PRIVATE
LAW
Andrew C. Michaels*

This essay presents an unusual and potentially valuable way of
thinking about the patent system. It is worth considering the ways
in which the structure of private law may affect our susceptibility
to undesirable forms of societal organization. This essay considers
how a well-structured patent system could potentially reduce our
susceptibility to fascism by: (1) promoting an ethos of independent
creative thought, and (2) facilitating market entry by startups,
thereby reducing market concentration and possibly reducing
authoritarian hierarchy. One legitimate utilitarian aim of the
patent system might be to thus promote horizontal individualism,
which could tend to work against fascism’s extremely nationalistic
vertical collectivism. Promotion of individual autonomy might be
an under-recognized benefit of the patent system, suggesting a
valuable lens through which to view not only patent law, but also
other areas of private law.
I.

INTRODUCTION

There is some debate in the current literature about the proper aims of or
justifications for intellectual property.1 Some prominent scholars are concerned
about a “retreat from evidence” in IP scholarship.2 Such scholars point for example
to Robert Merges’ book Justifying Intellectual Property, which grounds IP partially
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1. Compare Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328 (2015)
(arguing that moral justifications for IP are unpersuasive and a step backward in a rational society), with
Robert P. Merges, Against Utilitarian Fundamentalism, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 681 (2016) (responding
that there are many paths to truth, not just pure utilitarianism).
2. Lemley, supra note 1, at 1337.
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in individual autonomy, drawing, inter alia, on the work of Immanuel Kant.3 The
concerned scholars worry that the “adherents of this new religion” believe “in IP as
an end in itself,” even though they “don’t believe [IP] is better for the world than
other systems, or that it encourages more innovation.”4
However, if the patent system promotes or reinforces individual autonomy,
as Professor Merges argues, that could be seen as a utilitarian aim in that it may give
us some reason to “think the world will be a better place as a result.”5 The patent
system’s constitutional objective to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts,”6 need not be viewed in narrow economic terms, and the “Supreme Court has
identified several public policy goals beyond technological advancement within the
patent system’s broad charge to promote progress, such as increasing employment
and enhancing social welfare.”7
The importance of individual autonomy is highlighted by its stark contrast
with the high level of conformity and submission required by fascism,8 a topic of
some current concern.9 The topic is sometimes considered controversial, but that is

3. See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 68 (2011) (“The Kantian
concepts I emphasize—individual will, appropriation (or ‘possession’), and personal freedom (or
autonomy)—are welcome additions to our understanding of the role of property in general.”).
4. Lemley, supra note 1, at 1337–38.
5. Id. at 1328; cf. Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Rational Faith: The Utility of Fairness in Copyright,
97 B.U. L. REV. 1487, 1490 (2017) (“If consideration of fairness is faith based, then, it is a rational faith,
because empirical evidence shows that fairness promotes utilitarian ends.”); Peter Lee, Toward a
Distributive Agenda for U.S. Patent Law, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 321, 354 (2017) (“At a foundational level,
the objective of maximizing social utility can require redistribution of resources, particularly given the
principle of diminishing marginal utility.”); Robert P. Merges, Autonomy and Independence: The
Normative Face of Transaction Costs, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 145, 150 (2011) (“[I]f independent production
serves important social values beyond efficiency, then we might consider bearing slightly higher
transaction costs than might be dictated by a strictly efficiency-based viewpoint.”).
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7. Lee, supra note 5, at 353; see also Dan L. Burk, Diversity Levers, 23 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL’Y 25, 28–29 (2015) (“But the concept of progress need not be confined to utility and might plausibly
encompass incommensurables such as human flourishing or dignity.”).
8. See ROB RIEMEN, TO FIGHT AGAINST THIS AGE: ON FASCISM AND HUMANISM 58 (2018)
(“Theodore Adorno: ‘The only true counterforce to the phenomenon of Auschwitz is individual autonomy,
the capacity for reflection, self-determination, not joining in, not assimilating, and being a man of
character, an independent spirit instead of a characterless individual.’”); STEPHANIE M. WALLS,
INDIVIDUALISM IN THE UNITED STATES: A TRANSFORMATION IN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 16
(2015) (“[A]n authoritarian state of any ilk would neither desire to nor strive to protect the rights of the
individual.”); John Duckitt, Authoritarianism and Group Identification: A New View of an Old Construct,
10 POL. PSYCHOL. 63, 70 (1989) (discussing authoritarianism and “obedience to ingroup leaders and
authorities — that is, authoritarian submission.”); Markus Kemmelmeier et al., Individualism,
Collectivism, and Authoritarianism in Seven Societies, 34 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 304, 305 (2003)
(“[T]he cultural ideology of individualism appears to be diametrically opposed to the notion of conformity
to the group and subordination to authority.”).
9. See, e.g., HENRY A. GIROUX, AMERICAN NIGHTMARE: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF FASCISM
(2018); ALEXANDER REID ROSS, AGAINST THE FASCIST CREEP (2017); JASON STANLEY, HOW FASCISM
WORKS: THE POLITICS OF US AND THEM (2018); Pierre Schlag, The American Road to Fascism (Law,
Politics, and Decadence) (Nov. 7, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with The New Mexico Law
Review); cf. Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV. 78
(2018).
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not necessarily in itself a good reason to avoid the topic.10 To be clear, America is
thankfully not currently fascist.11 But a gradual slide in that direction may well be
taking place,12 and there is no guarantee that “it” won’t happen here.13
In a broader sense then, the thesis of this essay is that the structure of our
private law potentially affects our susceptibility to fascism, and that it is worth trying
to understand how. This is not a novel idea, “anti-fascism served as a dominant
motivation underlying the post-War antitrust regimes in both the United States and
Europe.”14 But this essay provides a novel (as far as the author is aware) argument
that anti-fascism could be one appropriate goal or benefit of the patent system, and
serves as an invitation for legal scholars to resume or conduct similar analyses in
other areas of law.
With its vertical collectivist organization,15 fascism is both a particular form
of totalitarianism, and a particular form of authoritarianism. It is authoritarian (and
vertical) in a hierarchical “follow the leader” sense, and it is totalitarian (and
nationally collectivist) in that requires complete devotion to the State or the Volk,
leaving no space for individual autonomy.16 As Robert Paxton explains, this
obligatory collectivist ultranationalism is a main characteristic of fascism: “the
primacy of the group, toward which one has duties superior to every right, whether

10. Cf. RIEMEN, supra note 8, at 18 (“Wise men like Confucius and Socrates knew that to be able to
understand something, you had to call it by its proper name. The term populism, being the preferred
description for a modern-day revolt of the masses, will not provide any meaningful understanding
concerning that phenomenon.”).
11. See Cass R. Sunstein, It Can Happen Here, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (June 28, 2018),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2018/06/28/hitlers-rise-it-can-happen-here/ (“[W]ell, it’s not fascism,
but the United States has not seen anything like it before.”); cf. GIROUX, supra note 9, at 44 (“[T]he
mobilizing ideas, policies, and ruthless social practices of fascism, wrapped in the flag and discourses of
racial purity, ultra-nationalism, and militarism, are at the center of power. . . . “).
12. Cf. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 440 (new ed. 1966) (“The road to
totalitarian domination leads through many intermediate stages. . . . “); Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 9, at
168 (“There is a low risk, in our view, of either military coup or the institutionalization of permanent
emergency rule. . . . The threat of constitutional retrogression is more substantial, we think, and more
insidious.”).
13. See RIEMEN, supra note 8, at 34 (“Camus and Mann certainly weren’t the only ones who, once
the war was over, quickly realized what we are all too eager to forget: that the fascist bacillus will always
remain virulent in the body of mass democracy.”); cf. ALBERT CAMUS, THE PLAGUE 308 (Stuart Gilbert
trans., Vintage Books Int’l 1st ed. 1991) (1947) (“[T]he plague bacillus never dies or disappears for good;
that it can lie dormant for years and years in furniture and linen-chests; that it bides its time in bedrooms,
cellars, trunks, and bookshelves; and that perhaps the day would come when, for the bane and the
enlightening of men, it would rouse up its rats again and send them forth to die in a happy city.”).
14. Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and Democracy: A Case Study from German Fascism 19 Law & Econ.
Working Papers, Art. 155 2018), https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1266&
context=law_econ_current.
15. See infra Part III(C).
16. Cf. ROBERT O. PAXTON, THE ANATOMY OF FASCISM 217 (2004) (footnote omitted) (“Although
authoritarian regimes often trample civil liberties and are capable of murderous brutality, they do not share
fascism’s urge to reduce the private sphere to nothing. . . . Authoritarians would rather leave the
population demobilized and passive, while fascists want to engage and excite the public. Authoritarians
want a strong but limited state.”).
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individual or universal, and the subordination of the individual to it.”17 As such,
deeply embedded notions of American “rugged individualism” and selfdetermination may tend to be defenses against fascism, though on the other hand,
there is also a strong conformist aspect to the American ethos.18
The patent system is designed in part to encourage creative individuals to
think differently and invent something that would not have been obvious.19 In
promoting autonomous thinking by incentivizing entrepreneurial innovation, an
effective patent system may tend to make us less susceptible to collectivist
totalitarianism, albeit perhaps only marginally. A fascist regime does not want free
thinking citizens; Victor Klemperer describes the Third Reich as wanting: “to strip
everyone of their individuality, to paralyze them as personalities, to make them into
unthinking and docile cattle in a herd driven and hounded in a particular direction,
to turn them into atoms in a huge rolling block of stone.”20 A society with a greater
number of entrepreneurial inventors who think for themselves would seemingly tend
to be less prone to complete uniform devotion to a nationalistic vision.21
At the least, these sorts of effects seem worth thinking about for patent law,
and a fortiori for private law in general.22 How might private law be structured so as
to promote individual autonomy? What are the effects of private law on market
concentration? How does the promotion of autonomy, or the extent of market
concentration, affect our potential susceptibility to fascism? The goal of this essay is
not necessarily to provide definitive answers but rather to demonstrate the
importance of these sorts of questions and the potential value of further inquiry along
these lines. The argument here is not that a well-structured patent system can serve
as an absolute barrier to fascism, nor is the claim that a country without a patent
system will necessarily be fascist. The patent system is but one factor amongst many,
but its effects are nevertheless worthy of consideration. Though the effects on
societal levels of individual autonomy attributable to the structure of patent law alone

17. Id. at 219; see also ROSS, supra note 9, at 7 (“The other side of the paranoid specter of the parasite
or the cancer is the national community as an organic body—whether based on biological race theory or
cultural-linguistic ethnocentrism.”).
18. See, e.g., BARBARA EHRENREICH, BRIGHT-SIDED: HOW THE RELENTLESS PROMOTION OF
POSITIVE THINKING HAS UNDERMINED AMERICA 55 (2009) (“What has changed, in the last few years, is
that the advice to at least act in a positive way has taken on a harsher edge. The penalty for nonconformity
is going up. . . . “).
19. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); infra Part II(A).
20. JASON STANLEY, HOW PROPAGANDA WORKS 2 (2015) (quoting VICTOR KLEMPERER, THE
LANGUAGE OF THE THIRD REICH (Martin Brady trans., Bloomsbury Publishing PLC. 1975) (1947)); see
also infra Part II(B).
21. Cf. Justin N. Kaushall, Can Art Fight Fascism?, 129 PHILOSOPHY NOW 14, 16 (“This brings me
to the final reason why art may resist fascism. Art is able to critically think about society, and so indicate
a better one, because it is partially autonomous from society and history.”); Phil Treagus, Brad Evans: A
World Without Books is a World Foreclosed, READING LISTS (June 1, 2017),
www.thereadinglists.com/brad-evans-reading-list/ (“Every great tyranny begins by declaring a war upon
the imagination and the appropriation or imprisonment of those deemed to be its most creative.”).
22. See Pierre Schlag, The Knowledge Bubble—Something Amiss in Expertopia, in SEARCHING FOR
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT 428 (Justin Desautels-Stein & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2017)
(arguing in favor of greater focus on macro effects of law in general).
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might be relatively minor, the effects of private law as a whole may well be quite
significant.23
The effects of public law (governing vertical interactions between citizens
and the State),24 on political organization and individual autonomy are, to be sure,
also important. For example, a larger estate tax on the wealthy might tend to work
against authoritarianism by reducing entrenched hierarchy in society.25 Moreover,
those at the bottom of a highly unequal society, without other prospects for creating
meaningful lives, might tend to rally around an ultranationalistic (or racist)
worldview, forming the unthinking and loyal “mob” required for totalitarianism.26
But the point in this essay is that the effects of private law (governing horizontal
interactions between citizens) on individual autonomy, while perhaps less obvious,
should not be overlooked.
Aside from encouraging an ethos of independent creative thought, in a more
tangible economic sense, there is considerable evidence that the economic rewards
protected by the patent system tend to facilitate market entry by startups, at least in
certain sectors.27 By working against market concentration, a functional patent
system may enhance autonomy by giving technology sector employees more choice
as to where to work.28 Because of the societal benefits of a less concentrated
marketplace, the effects of the patent system on market concentration, often
overlooked and under-appreciated,29 are worthy of more attention.
History has shown that a patent system may be corrupted and used as a
propaganda tool to further a fascist regime.30 Thus while an ideal patent system may
tend to work against fascism, it is essential to protect the integrity and openness of

23. Cf. Adam J MacLeod, Strategic and Tactical Totalization in the Totalitarian Epoch, 5 BRIT. J.
AM. LEGAL STUD. 57, 73 (2016) (arguing that that private law is “necessarily at odds with totalitarian
rule,” in part because “totalitarian governments cannot let freethinking citizens and institutions flex their
practical-reasoning muscles on questions of civic importance”).
24. The distinction between public and private law is notoriously fuzzy and difficult, but in this essay
private law is used to mean law that primarily defines “the rights and duties private individuals and
associations owe each other,” as opposed to public law, which “regulates the internal conduct of
government and government’s relationship to private parties.” Paul A. Diller, The City and the Private
Right of Action, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1116 (2012). A patentee’s rights to exclude other private parties
from infringing the patent, then, would be private law in this sense. Martha Chamallas, Beneath the
Surface of Civil Recourse Theory, 88 IND. L.J. 527, 530 (2013) (“[T]he rhetoric of civil recourse theory
downplays the significance of the state and casts private individuals as the primary actors.”).
25. Cf. Åsbjørn Melkevik, A Tax Dead on Arrival: Classical Liberalism, Inheritance, and Social
Mobility, 22 CRITICAL REV. INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 200, 202 (2019) (“advocating for an inheritance tax
that is calibrated to the inheritor’s wealth to limit the growth of fortunes and further equality of opportunity
from a classical liberal perspective”).
26. Cf. ARENDT, supra note 12, at 107 (“[T]he mob will always shout for the ‘strong man,’ the ‘great
leader.’ For the mob hates society from which it is excluded, as well as Parliament where it is not
represented.”).
27. See infra Part III(A).
28. See infra Part III(B).
29. See, e.g., Lucas S. Osborn et al., A Case for Weakening Patent Rights, 89 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
1185 (2015) (recommending that the patent system should be weakened by twenty-five to fifty percent,
without considering market concentration effects).
30. See infra Part II(C).
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the patent system, and be wary of the introduction into patent law of considerations
of the inventor’s nationality or personal characteristics.
Part II contrasts fascism with the notions of individualism reflected in the
patent system. Part III discusses how patents can also promote autonomy in an
economic sense by reducing market concentration.
II - PHILOSOPHICAL
A. Patents and Individual Autonomy
In Justifying Intellectual Property,31 Robert Merges makes a strong case for
grounding intellectual property partially in the autonomy interest of the inventor or
creator. According to Professor Merges, a “personal, autonomous, and active” will,
which is “highly individual,” is “an essential aspect of what [Kant] thought it means
to be human,”32 such that “the essence of property for Kant is this: other people have
a duty to respect claims over objects that are bound up with the exercise of an
individual’s will.”33 For Hegel as well, “property enables the abstract person to
develop individuating characteristics that enable her to engage in intersubjective
relations.”34 Property is necessary to allow the Kantian autonomous will to flourish,
and Merges argues that this justification of property extends to intellectual property
rights as well. The ability of an inventor to express her Kantian autonomous will by
transforming “off-the-shelf materials into prototypes, rough designs, and finished
products,” deserves respect, and “stable possession is required for a creator to fully
work his will on a found object.”35
As Professor Merges explains, “Michelangelo’s rights over a block of
marble must include continuing access while he is working on it,” and “might very
well include the right to control what happens to the statue after he finishes it,” so as
to “further his purpose or goal in carving the statue, that is, the end to which he

31. MERGES, supra note 3.
32. Id. at 76. Kant is of course far from the only important philosopher to have highly valued the
autonomous individual will. See, e.g., SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE ETHICS OF AMBIGUITY 138 (Bernard
Frechtman trans., 4th paperbound ed. 1968) (1948) (“[A]s Kant would say, the value of an act lies not in
its conformity to an external model, but in its internal truth.”); BERTRAND RUSSELL, POLITICAL IDEALS
77 (Prometheus Books, Great Books in Philosophy Series, 2005) (1917) (“To preserve and strengthen the
impulse that makes individuality should be the foremost object of all political institutions.”); JEAN-PAUL
SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM IS A HUMANISM 23 (John Kulka ed., Carol Macomber trans., Yale Univ. Press
2007) (1947) (“[T]he first effect of existentialism is to make every man conscious of what he is, and to
make him solely responsible for his own existence.”).
33. MERGES supra note 3, at 72.
34. Stewart E. Sterk, Intellectualizing Property: The Tenuous Connections Between Land and
Copyright, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 424 (2005).
35. MERGES supra note 3, at 76. This notion of stability and individual labor is also grounded in
Locke’s labor theory of value. Id. at 34 (“Locke establishes the essential foundation of a system of private
property rights—a one-to-one mapping between individual people and discrete economic resources.”);
see also Adam Mossoff, Introduction to EDWARD ELGAR, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PROPERTY
RIGHTS xv–xvi (Adam Mossoff ed., 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2466479 (“Lockean labor-desert
theories can justify patent doctrines and have in fact played a determinative role in the formation and
evolution of these doctrines.”).
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applies his will.”36 This purpose “includes a desire to develop his talent, to earn a
reputation as an artist, and ultimately to make a living as an artist,” so as to “fully
reflect and encourage an expansive sense of the creator’s autonomy.”37 Patents may
similarly be seen as supporting inventor autonomy, by granting inventors the
extended possession which protects the “mental toil and perspiration” that is required
for an inventive vision to be had or to be realized in the world.38 Additionally, it has
been argued that “inventors have a strong personhood stake in their inventions and
in the inventive process,” and an inventor has “autonomy over her own
inventiveness,” which patents help to protect.39
A patentable invention is in some sense, by definition, a result of
autonomous creative thinking that would not have been obvious even to one of
ordinary skill in the relevant art.40 One way of tailoring the patent law to better
promote individualism, then, might be to strengthen the non-obviousness
requirement, i.e., require a greater “inventive step” beyond the prior art in order to
receive a patent. Other commentators have already argued in favor of this sort of
heightened bar to patentability, pointing out that a “low obviousness requirement can
‘stifle, rather than promote, the progress of the useful arts.’”41 Requiring a greater
inventive step might tend to incentivize individuals and or small groups (such as
startups) to think more creatively, aiming for major breakthroughs as opposed to
mere marginal improvements over the prior art. Although this would result in a
reduction of the number of patents granted, it would not necessarily work against the
market dispersing benefits of patents discussed in Part III, given that startups tend to
be disproportionately creative and particularly well suited to fundamental
breakthrough innovation, rather than mere marginal improvements.42 Requiring a
larger inventive step could result in fewer patents granted, but it would also
strengthen enforceability and restore some public confidence in the patent system by
ensuring that only true inventions receive patents.
According to economic historian Professor Zorina Khan, the “fuel of
interest” supplied by the U.S. patent system has “induced growing numbers of people
36. MERGES, supra note 3, at 81.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 79.
39. Steven Cherensky, Comment, A Penny for Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Preinvention
Assignment Agreements, Property, and Personhood, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 648, 52 (1993); see also
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
40. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
41. Ryan Abbott, Everything is Obvious, 66 UCLA L. REV. 2, 47 (2018) (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007)); see also DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS
AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009).
42. See John Freeman & Jerome S. Engel, Models of Innovation: Startups and Mature Corporations,
CAL. MGMT. REV., Fall 2007, at 94, 117 (“Where innovations are most disruptive of existing markets,
organizational structures, and management processes, existing mature corporations find innovation
especially challenging. . . . Such factors slow the innovation process in mature corporations, opening a
window in time for entrepreneurs to start and grow new companies.”); see also E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL
IS BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATTERED 229 (Harper & Row 1975) (1973) (“[T]he specific
danger inherent in large-scale organisation is that its natural bias and tendency favour order, at the expense
of creative freedom.”); Lee, supra note 5, at 364 (“Numerous studies reveal that small entities are
disproportionately innovative relative to large corporations.”).
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to invest more in inventive activity and innovation,” and has been “instrumental in
directing the efforts of a diverse array of individuals toward extracting returns from
their improvements.”43 The fundamental spirit of the patent law is thus in part one of
Kantian sapere aude – of daring to think for oneself – antipodal to the “follow the
leader” style anti-intellectualism of fascism.44
B. Fascism and Individual Autonomy
Fascist philosophy could fairly be characterized as consisting of extreme
nationalism and racism.45 In discussing more elaborate characterizations, the purpose
here is certainly not to give fascism more credit than it deserves; rather, it is to
understand the state-wide totalitarian nationalistic collectivism of fascism, so as to
consider how private law (including patent law) might tend to work against
preconditions for fascism by promoting individualism. That the Kantian autonomy
ideally reflected in and promoted by the patent system is antithetical to the
philosophy of fascism can be seen, for example, in the words of Giovanni Gentile:
The Fascist State, in order to penetrate and direct the consciousness of its
citizens, wishes to organize them in national unity; a unity possessed of a soul. That
unity would manifest itself as a unitary being, possessed of powerful will, and a
consciousness of its own ends.46
This idea of a unity, or “unitary being” possessed of a will is somewhat
reminiscent of, but very different from, Kant’s notion of the Wille, the universal,
rationalizing will or collective sense of reason, (as opposed to the “personal will,” or
Willkur).47 Gentile holds, unlike Kant, that the personal will is entirely eclipsed or
subsumed by the will of the unitary being such that: “My will is not my own; it is a
universal will.”48 Drawing on the work of Gentile, Joseph Verbovszky elaborates on

43. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION 107 (2005); see also infra Part III.
44. See PAXTON, supra note 16, at 139 (“Since leaders supposedly had superhuman mental powers,
fascist militants preferred to settle intellectual matters by a reductio ad ducem.”); cf. RUSSELL, supra note
32, at 20 (“In every walk of life, independence of mind is punished by failure, more and more as economic
organizations grow larger and more rigid. Is it surprising that men become increasingly docile,
increasingly ready to submit to dictation and to forego the right of thinking for themselves?”).
45. Cf. TONY JUDT WITH TIMOTHY SNYDER, THINKING THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 159 (2012) (“The
fascists don’t really have concepts. They have attitudes.”); ROSS, supra note 9, at 331 (“Fascism is fidelity
to inequality and brutality.”).
46. GIOVANNI GENTILE, ORIGINS AND DOCTRINE OF FASCISM 72 (A. James Gregor ed., A. James
Gregor Trans., Routledge 2017) (1932); see also PAXTON, supra note 16, at 17 (“Only in 1932, after he
had been in power for ten years, and when he wanted to ‘normalize’ his regime, did Mussolini expound
Fascist doctrine, in an article (partly ghostwritten by the philosopher Giovanni Gentile) for the new
Enciclopedia italiana.”).
47. In Justifying Intellectual Property, Merges speaks primarily of the personal Kantian will, or
Willkur. See MERGES, supra note 3, at 338 n.24. The Kantian universal rationalizing Wille could perhaps
be analogized to the legal community’s collective sense of reason, something akin to “thinking like a
lawyer.”
48. GENTILE, supra note 46, at 84; cf. CAMUS, supra note 13, at 167 (“No longer were there individual
destinies; only a collective destiny, made of plague and the emotions shared by all.”).

Summer 2019

THE PATENT LAWYER'S GUIDE TO FASCISM

177

the idea of the fascist state or group as “unitary being” (or Volk), and argues that
fascism should be seen as “an ethos, a philosophy, a way of thought.”49
According to Verbovszky, fascists begin with the conception of life as a
struggle, where the only way to survive “is to be stronger than one’s adversary.”50
The way to make it in this cruel world, for fascists, is to band together into a Volk,
where the “family is grafted out of its purely domestic role and onto the national
stage.”51 The Volk is Gentile’s “unitary being,” a meta-person, it is “an impersonal
individual who possesses a separate and transcendent will made from the collective
wills of all the people in a society.”52
Similarly, Roger Griffin finds that fascism “tends to be associated with a
concept of the nation as a ‘higher’ racial, historical, spiritual or organic reality which
embraces all the members of the ethical community who belong to it.”53 Thus the
people in a fascist society (or State)54 are all part of a “collective consciousness, a
‘hive-mind’ so to speak, that has its own consciousness and will, functioning as an
individual person,” such that for fascists, “the only real concern of a person’s life
should be that he directs himself according to the will of the Volk.”55 Verbovzky
claims that history has shown fascists individually to be “quite unafraid of death”
(citing for example the Japanese Kamakazi),56 which would be in accord with the
idea that a fascist society tends to view itself as a single unitary being.57
The fascist requirement of complete devotion to a unitary being identified
with the State is quite incompatible with individual autonomy.58 Whereas the subject
of a liberal (limited) state is sovereign and individual,59 the subject of a totalitarian
49. Joseph Verbovszky, The Nature of Fascist Thought 1 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
New Mexico Law Review).
50. Id. at 3.
51. Id. at 5; see also TIMOTHY SNYDER, BLACK EARTH: THE HOLOCAUST AS HISTORY AND
WARNING 11–28 (2015) (describing Hitler’s collectivist version of Social Darwinism).
52. Verbovszky, supra note 49, at 5.
53. ROGER GRIFFIN, THE NATURE OF FASCISM 37 (Routledge 1993) (1991).
54. See Verbovszky, supra note 49, at 17 (“This is what the Italian Fascists conceived of as the Italian
Volk, even though Gentile refers to it as ‘The State.’ This reveals the fact that each form of Fascism
conceives of itself differently, in its own peculiar way. The Italian State functions in its capacity as a
Volk.”).
55. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 4; see also id. at 37 (“[T]he imperial Japanese sought to forge a warrior mentality across all
of Japan, a warrior mentality which valued sacrifice and, through certain tenets of Zen Buddhism allowed
for willful acceptance of death and self-annihilation which eventually represented itself in the famous
Kamikaze in the latter portion of the war.”).
57. Cf. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 172 (30th anniversary ed. 2006) (“Kamikaze
behaviour and other forms of altruism and cooperation by workers are not astonishing once we accept the
fact that they are sterile. . . . The death of a single sterile worker bee is no more serious to its genes than
is the shedding of a leaf in autumn to the genes of a tree.”).
58. See CHRIS HEDGES, EMPIRE OF ILLUSION 112 (2009) (“The single most important quality needed
to resist evil is moral autonomy.”); PAXTON, supra note 16, at 40 (“Fascisms seek out in each national
culture those themes that are best capable of mobilizing a mass movement of regeneration, unification,
and purity, directed against liberal individualism and constitutionalism and against Leftist class
struggle.”).
59. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be selfevident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”); MILTON FRIEDMAN,
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fascist state must be entirely or religiously devoted to the Volk.60 According to Robert
Paxton, “fascist leaders enjoyed a kind of supremacy,” which “rested on charisma, a
mysterious direct communication with the Volk or razza that needs no mediation”
and “resembled media-era celebrity ‘stardom,’ raised to a higher power by its say
over war and death.”61
The fascist hive-mind or unitary being is of course never fully realized in
practice,62 but fascist societies attempt to move in this direction by developing
methods of “differentiating who is and who is not part of the Volk.”63 The “Volk,
although based on the concept of ethnicity and race ultimately sets its own
parameters of belonging,”64 that is, the methods of differentiation may be rooted
primarily in ethnicity, as in the case of Nazis, or may instead be rooted more in
citizenship, as in the case of the Italian fascists.65 In fascist societies, individuals who
refuse to assimilate or conform to the requirements of the State “must be expelled
from the society or eradicated to preserve the organic unity of the Volk,” because
“conflicting identities interfere with the general interest of the Volk and result in
something quite unacceptable to Fascists, a pluralistic society.”66 For example, in
1937, “Himmler wished to enlarge the ‘group of enemies of the people’ to include
those who, although not politically active, had come to notice through ‘a typically
Jewish behavior that was damaging to the German People (Volk).’”67

Liberalism, Old Style (1955), reprinted in THE INDISPENSABLE MILTON FRIEDMAN (Lanny Ebenstein ed.,
2012) (“Liberalism, as it developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and flowered in the
nineteenth, puts major emphasis on the freedom of individuals to control their own destinies.
Individualism is its creed; collectivism and tyranny its enemy.”); John Finnis, Liberalism and Natural
Law Theory, 45 MERCER L. REV. 687, 687 (1994) (“[G]overnment and law should be limited in their range
of application. . . . “).
60. See STANLEY G. PAYNE, A HISTORY OF FASCISM 1914–1945, at 200 (1995) (“There is no
question that Hitler intended the Aryan racial ideology to fulfill a kind of religious function; the liturgical
character of Nazi public rituals was pronounced.”); Verbovszky, supra note 49, at 40 (alteration in
original) (“The Japanese traditionally had a very strong conception of a Volk. This was provided
historically by the state Shinto religion which Nitobe Inazo describes in his work Bushido: ‘Its [Shinto]
nature-worship endeared the country to our inmost souls, while its ancestor worship, tracing from lineage
to lineage, made the Imperial family the fountainhead of the whole nation.’” (quoting NITOBE INAZO,
BUSHIDO 57 (Sweetwater Press (2006))).
61. PAXTON, supra note 16, at 126.
62. GRIFFIN, supra note 53, at 41 (“[F]ascism must always in the last analysis be imposed by an elite
in the name of a national community yet to be realized, and whose realization, even once the movement
is installed in power, will initially (and in practice indefinitely) involve re-education, propaganda and
social control on a massive scale.”).
63. Verbovszky, supra note 49, at 6 (emphasis added); see also PAXTON at 216 (explaining that
fascism finds a technique to channel citizens’ “passions into the construction of an obligatory domestic
unity around projects of internal cleansing and external expansion”).
64. Verbovszky, supra note 49, at 17.
65. Id. (“[U]nlike the Nazi racial state that the term Volk infers; the Italian State was of a much more
cosmopolitan character, its basis being rooted in the citizenship of the Italian people, similar to Roman
custom, rather than phenotypic standards.”).
66. Id.
67. MARTIN DEAN, ROBBING THE JEWS: THE CONFISCATION OF JEWISH PROPERTY IN THE
HOLOCAUST, 1933–1945, at 39 (2008).
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Fascism is facially inconsistent with Kantian individual autonomy, or
Kant’s “Kingdom of Ends,” which posits that “all people should be treated as ‘ends
in themselves.’”68 The patent system provides one potential means of promoting or
reinforcing such individual autonomy, albeit a rather minor one, though the effects
of private law as a whole may well be more than minor.
C.

Patents and Propaganda

But the patent system must remain objectively focused on technology and
innovation; if it loses its integrity it may be turned into a propaganda tool for
fascism.69 Something of this sort appears to have happened in Nazi Germany, where
the patent system (along with the economy in general) was “Aryanized,” in that new
patents were only to be submitted if sponsored by an Aryan and German citizen (not
by foreigners or Jews), and important patents were to be transferred to “non-Jewish
control.”70 This was in part a way to promote Hitler’s vision of the inventor as Aryan
hero, highlighting the supposed inventive superiority of the Aryan Volk.71
The Nazi patent code “made it a special point to protect the inventor against
exploitation and abuse,” but also “the inventor had a duty to grant the state special
powers when that was in the national interest,” so overall the “new code adhered to
the party line” as regards to the “basic principle that the interests of the people and
the state come before the special interests of the individual.”72 Thus, wrote some of
the drafters, the “creative forces of technological progress serve to the honor of Volk
and the State,” and the “interests of the Volk and the State come before those of the
creator of the work.”73 Similarly, scholars studying contract law under National
Socialism have found that “fascist theory was based on the predominance of State

68. Merges, supra note 1, at 709.
69. ARENDT, supra note 12, at 341 (“Only the mob and the elite can be attracted by the momentum
of totalitarianism itself; the masses have to be won by propaganda.”).
70. See DEAN, supra note 67, at 111–113; Deutsches Patent - und Markenamt, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deutsches_Patent-_und_Markenamt (last visited Apr. 6, 2019).
71. See KEES GISPEN, POEMS IN STEEL: NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE POLITICS OF INVENTING
FROM WEIMAR TO BONN 45 (Berghahn Series, Monographs in German History Vol. 6, 2002); Avraham
Barkai, Aryanization, in HOW WAS IT POSSIBLE?: A HOLOCAUST READER 148 and n.17 (Peter Hayes ed.,
2015); cf. Robert O. Paxton, The Cultural Axis, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Oct. 26, 2017),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/10/26/nazi-fascist-cultural-axis/ (“Germany dominated the
world of science before 1933. . . . Far from capitalizing on this major soft power asset, Hitler destroyed it
by imposing ideological conformity and expelling Jewish scientists such as the talented nuclear physicist
Lise Meitner.”).
72. GISPEN, supra note 71, at 205 (quotingFranz Schlegelberger, Die Grundlagen des neuen
Patentrechts, BERLINER BÖRSEN-ZEITUNG, Oct. 30, 1935 (morning edition)); see also PETER BALDWIN,
THE COPYRIGHT WARS 179, 191–92 (2014)(“Nazi ideology regarded creativity as possible only within
its social setting. It turned society into the author’s equal in the creative endeavor. . . . “).
73. GISPEN, supra note 71, at 193–94 (quoting Memorandum from Karl Riemschneider & Kurt
Waldmann to Akademie für Deutsches Recht (1934)); cf. Paxton, supra note 71, (“At a Nazi Party
Congress on Culture in September 1933 [Hitler] promised that the Nazi state would intervene more
actively in cultural matters than the Weimar Republic had done, in order to make art an expression of the
‘hereditary racial bloodstock’ and to transform artists into defenders of the German Volk.”).
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will over private will rather than manifesting any intention to protect the interests of
a particular party.”74
In the years leading up to this Aryanization of the patent system, there was
a push for legal protection and economic realization of “German intellectual matter,
free from Jewish greed, borne by national pride and braced by the motto: ‘German
creations for the Germans first!’”75 Jewish patent attorneys were expelled from the
profession, so as to “clean up the invention-promotion business.”76 While certainly
not rising to this level, the fact that the U.S. State Department was recently
considering “public diplomacy” efforts using the hashtag “#MostAmericanIP,” is not
reassuring.77 What exactly would it mean for a patent to be more or less American?
Referencing this incident, Sapna Kumar has observed that “[t]he government’s
commitment to promoting innovation can, at times, border on propaganda.”78
The Aryanization of the German patent system could be seen as an example
of the “friend/enemy distinction” creeping into the patent law. This friend/enemy
distinction is a hallmark of fascist legal thought, as seen in the work of the famous
Nazi legal theorist Carl Schmitt,79 who offered “that distinction as crucial to the
intelligibility and practice of politics (in the same way, as he put it, that good/evil is
key to morality or beautiful/ugly is key to aesthetics).”80 Schmitt was the “Crown
Jurist of the Third Reich.”81 He was a critic of rule of law and the liberal state, and
argued “that the decision of a people regarding its own political form and destiny
outlines a level of deep legitimacy that is more important than legality.”82 In a fascist
state, it is ultimately The Leader that decides who is friend and who is enemy, and

74. P. G. Monateri & Alessandro Somma, The Fascist Theory of Contract, CARDOZO ELECTRONIC
L. BULL., 2009 at 20.
75. GISPEN, supra note 71, at 173 (quoting Memorandum from Konrad Pfreundner to
Reichsregierung (May 1, 1933)).
76. Id. at 214.
77. See David Kravets, State Department concocting “fake” intellectual property “Twitter feud,”
ARS TECHNICA (Jul. 6, 2017, 1:41 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/07/state-departmentconcocting-fake-intellectual-property-twitter-feud/ (“Our public diplomacy office is still settling on a
hashtag and a specific moment that will be unique to the State Department, but then we invite you to
respond with your own #MostAmericanIP, or #BestIPMoment.” (quoting E-mail from U.S. State Dep’t
to Mark A. Lemley, Dir. of the Stan. Program in Law, Sci., and Tech., Stan. L. Sch.)).
78. Sapna Kumar, Innovation Nationalism, 51 CONN. L. REV. (manuscript at 25) (forthcoming 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3134106; cf. Andrei Iancu, Dir., U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Remarks
delivered at the Eastern District of Texas Bar Association Inaugural Texas Dinner (Oct. 18, 2018)
(available at https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/remarks-director-iancu-eastern-districttexas-bar-association-inaugural-texas) (“Born of our Constitution and steeped in our glorious history, the
American patent system is a crown jewel; a gold standard. Stop attacking it.”).
79. CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (George Schwab trans., Rutgers Univ. Press
1976) (1927).
80. Schlag, supra note 9, at 4.
81. Charles E. Frye, Carl Schmitt’s Concept of the Political, 28 J. POL. 818, 818 (1966).
82. Carlo Galli, Carl Schmitt’s Antiliberalism: Its Theoretical and Historical Sources and Its
Philosophical and Political Meaning, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1601 (2000); see also Eric A. Posner
& Adrian Vermeule, Demystifying Schmitt 8(Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper
No. 333, 2011) (alteration in the original) (“Schmitt famously declared that ‘[s]overeign is he who decides
on the exception.’” (quoting CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY 5 (1985)).
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“justice” thus lies in The Leader’s hands, rather than those of the law.83 Unifying the
people (or the Volk) against “the enemy,” helps to create or stoke the ultranationalist
collectivism required for fascism.84
With respect to patent law, then, the law should remain objectively focused
on technological merits, rather than the nationality or personal characteristics of the
inventors; the patent system should not become a tool for nationalistic propaganda.
III - ECONOMIC
An effective patent system may tend to promote or protect autonomy in a
more tangible economic sense, by decreasing market concentration. The effects of
the patent system on market concentration seem to depend on the industrial sector,
varying based on industry characteristics such as the importance of network effects,
and the size of initial research and development costs versus the costs of copying for
particular technologies.85 Given the importance of market concentration to individual
autonomy,86 the effects are worth considering, not only for patent law but for other
areas of private law as well, including antitrust. This part first considers the evidence
suggesting that a functional patent system may reduce market concentration in
certain sectors; second considers how reduced market concentration may promote
autonomy; and third considers how market structure may tend to affect our
susceptibility to fascism.
A. Market Concentration and Patents
Professor Merges finds that the “general policy suggested by Kant’s
writings has to do with encouraging a larger number of smaller creative entities, as
opposed to a smaller number of larger ones.”87 He argues that intellectual property
can further this general policy, for example, property rights covering inputs (such as
a touchscreen for cell phones) “allow the makers of the input to set themselves up as
a separate, independent firm,” which “gives them more say over their work, more
control over their professional fate—more autonomy.”88 Perhaps in part because of

83. Cf. Schlag, supra note 9, at 4 (“Trump is an expert at making clear who is friend and who is
enemy.”); C.J. Polychroniou, Blueprint for a Progressive US: A Dialogue with Noam Chomsky and Robert
Pollin, TRUTHOUT (Oct. 17, 2017), https://truthout.org/articles/blueprint-for-a-progressive-us-a-dialoguewith-noam-chomsky-and-robert-pollin/ (“Chomsky:. . . . The figure in charge, though often ridiculed, has
succeeded brilliantly in his goal of occupying media and public attention while mobilizing a very loyal
popular base — and one with sinister features, sometimes smacking of totalitarianism, including adoration
of The Leader.”).
84. Cf. RIEMEN, supra note 8, at 83 (“But fascist techniques are identical everywhere: the presence
of a charismatic leader; the use of populism to mobilize the masses; the designation of the base group as
victims (of crises, of elites, or of foreigners); and the direction of all resentment toward an ‘enemy.’”).
85. See infra Part III(A); cf. Dan L. Burk, Law and Economics of Intellectual Property: In Search of
First Principles, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397, 411 (2012) (“[I]t seems likely that exclusive rights are
performing different roles in different economic sectors.”); Lemley, supra note 1, at 1334 (“The
relationship between patents and innovation seems to depend greatly on industry. . . . “).
86. See infra Part III(B)–(C).
87. MERGES, supra note 3, at 81.
88. Id. at 83.
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this enhanced autonomy, “[n]umerous studies reveal that small entities are
disproportionately innovative relative to large corporations.”89
The 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey showed, according to Merges, a
“resurgence of small companies as a major source of new technologies,” and that for
“creative scientists, engineers, and inventors of all stripes, this has meant new
opportunities to own and participate in small companies,” with patents being “one
key to the success of these companies.”90 That survey also showed that “the holding
of patents by technology-based startups is even more widespread than previously
believed,”91 and that a primary reason startups patent “is to prevent others from
copying the startup’s products and services.”92
Similarly, a 2017 study finds evidence that, at least in the IT sector, patents
may be particularly valuable for startups.93 A startup with patent protection may
specialize in a narrow product or service, instead of trying to compete directly with
the integrated technology behemoths.94 This suggests that in the absence of a
functional patent system, there would be a more concentrated technology
marketplace, particularly in spaces with significant network effects such as software
and information technology,95 as large companies would be undeterred from using
their vast resources to copy or reverse engineer the products and services offered by
successful startups.96 The large would-be infringers could then integrate their
knockoff versions into their existing networked suites of products and services, a
potentially insurmountable marketplace advantage.97
Patents do not necessarily prevent such integration (which may be
beneficial to consumers) but they do protect the inventive efforts of startups in the

89. Lee, supra note 5, at 364.
90. MERGES, supra note 3, at 212 (citing Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs
and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255
(2009)).
91. Id. at 384 n.31.
92. Graham et al., supra note 90, at 1297.
93. Joan Farre-Mensa et al., What is a Patent Worth? Evidence from the U.S. Patent “Lottery” 4
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper 23268, 2017).
94. See David J. Teece, Capturing Value from Technological Innovation: Integration, Strategic
Partnering, and Licensing Decisions, INTERFACES, May–June 1988, at 46, 46–47, 49–53, 55; GARY P.
PISANO, SCIENCE BUSINESS: THE PROMISE, THE REALITY, AND THE FUTURE OF BIOTECH (2006).
95. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Three Quasi-Fallacies in the Conventional Understanding of
Intellectual Property, 12 J.L., ECON. & POL’Y 1, 5 (2016) (“With the exception of the biopharmaceutical
industry, large integrated technology firms tend to resist expansions of the patent system, both today and
in the past.”).
96. See MERGES, supra note 3, at 212 (“[L]arger trading partners may sometimes copy new
technologies, and without patents the smaller company has little effective recourse.”). While such a
possibility might seem to be in tension with the conception of a patent as a government sanctioned
monopoly, the fact is that in “most situations, a patent holder does not hold a ‘monopoly’ over a relevant
technology market.” David J. Teece & Edward F. Sherry, On Patent “Monopolies”: An Economic ReAppraisal, ANTITRUST CHRON., Spring 2017, at 19, 20.
97. See Tim Wu, Blind Sport: The Attention Economy and the Law (2017) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with The New Mexico Law Review) (“The media and technology industries are now dominated
by large companies like Facebook, Google, and the media conglomerates that both rely on the Attention
Broker business model and are also engaged in a near-constant series of mergers and acquisitions.”).
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sense that, in order to integrate the startup’s invention, an incumbent must at least
either buy the startup,98 or potentially face an infringement lawsuit.99 Such a suit
could be brought directly by the startup, but a startup might prefer to sell its patents
to a non-practicing assertion entity (sometimes called a “patent troll”) thereby
avoiding the risk and distraction of a lawsuit, as well as generating immediate
revenue that could help keep the startup afloat. The existence of this possibility could
encourage a large incumbent to buy a startup instead of simply infringing secure in
the knowledge that the startup likely lacks the resources and will to engage in the
protracted litigation necessary to enforce patent rights. Without patent protection,
some innovative startups might not receive the funding necessary to get off the
ground, for as Peter Menell has observed: “Without the potential for a large reward,
inventors contemplating innovative new platforms might not be willing to make the
substantial, risky R&D and marketing investments needed to challenge, and
hopefully leapfrog, the incumbent platform.”100
Patent protection in this way facilitates the ability of startups to obtain the
financing and investment (often in the form of venture capital) necessary to enter the
market, at least in certain important sectors outside of pharmaceuticals, such as
software, information technology, and biomedical devices.101 In other words,
“patents are powerful antimonopoly weapons—the vital slingshots ‘Davids’ use to
98. Cf. Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1063, 1077 (2008) (“[S]ome scholars have demonstrated that intensive patenting by acquisition targets
produces upward adjustments in purchase prices.”); Andres Sawicki, Buying Teams, 38 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 651, 654 (2015) (patents play an underappreciated role in protecting teams during “acqui-hires,” that
is, transactions “in which a large technology company (the buyer) purchases a start-up with the primary
purpose of employing the start-up’s engineers”); Gustavo Grullon et al., Are US Industries Becoming
More Concentrated? 25 (October 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with The New Mexico Law
Review) (“[A]dvances in technology have made innovation more resource-consuming, thus essentially
creating entry barriers to new firms, and encouraging them to sell their inventions to larger corporations
at early stages of development.”).
99. Cf. B. Zorina Khan, Trolls and Other Patent Inventions: Economic History and the Patent
Controversy in the Twenty-First Century, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 825, 835 (2014) (“[T]echnology
markets provide ample evidence that intermediaries benefited creative individuals, since patentees who
licensed or assigned their rights to such ‘trolls’ were typically the most productive and specialized
inventors.”).
100. Peter S. Menell, Economic Analysis of Network Effects and Intellectual Property, in 1 RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Ben Deporter & Peter S. Menell,
eds., forthcoming Aug. 2019) (manuscript at 14) (on file with the New Mexico Law Review); see also
Brief of Amici Curiae US Inventor, Inc. et al. in Support of Petitioner at 3–4, Oil States Energy Servs.,
LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) (No. 16-712) (“Reducing the value of
patents affects the ex ante calculation of all investors, throughout the economy. This in turn reduces the
availability of start-up capital. Only incumbent large companies benefit from such a state of affairs.”); id.
at 9–10 (discussing as an example, Tinnus Enters., LLC v. Telebrands Corp., 846 F.3d 1190 (Fed. Cir.
2017)).
101. SeeXuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Acquiring Innovation, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 775, 784
(2008) (“The value of a startup company is often dependent on its patent portfolios.”); Farre-Mensa et.
al., supra note 93 (“[W]e find that [a patent grant] increases a startup’s chances of securing funding from
VCs over the next three years by 47%, and of securing a loan by pledging the patent as collateral by
76%.”); cf. Graham & Sichelman, supra note 98, at 1078 (“[S]cholars have found that increased patenting
by venture-backed companies in the software and biotech industries is significantly correlated with total
investment. . . . “).
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take on ‘Goliaths.’”102 As such, proposals that have been advanced (generally under
the auspices of economic efficiency) “to maintain the patent system on drugs and a
few other products that are expensive to innovate and cheap to copy, and eliminate
patents on everything else,”103 could have the undesirable (and probably unintended)
effect of increasing market concentration by maintaining patents only in those
sectors where patents tend to benefit incumbents rather than new entrants. Thus
without patents, the “winner-take-all” nature of many technology markets,104 could
become even more pronounced.105
Reducing market concentration is in accord with the patent system’s goals;
though this purpose is not as prominent in the more modern jurisprudence. Supreme
Court decisions in cases such as Kewanee,106 and Bonito Boats,107 placed a striking
emphasis on the patent systems role in fostering a competitive marketplace and
protecting the rights of smaller businesses.108
The theory that patents facilitate market entry and reduce technology
market concentration also finds some support in “[the] historical lobbying behavior
in the patent context, which shows that small inventors (or investment entities that
fund small inventors) tend to promote strong intellectual property coverage while
large technology-dependent firms (outside of pharmaceuticals and chemicals) tend
to promote moderate and sometimes even weak or zero levels of intellectual property
coverage,” as Jonathan Barnett has noted.109 More recently, Professor Barnett has
argued that “reducing IP rights can increase costs for users while raising entry
barriers.”110 According to Professor Barnett, the support of pharmaceutical industry
incumbents “for strong patents can be explained by the exceptionally large difference
between the R&D, testing, and marketing costs borne by a first-mover innovator and

102. Stephen H. Haber et al., On the Importance to Economic Success of Property Rights in Finance
and Innovation, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215, 222 (2008); see also Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128
F.2d 632, 643 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J., concurring) (“The threat from patent monopolies in the hands of
such ‘outsiders’ may create a sort of competition—a David versus Goliath competition—which reduces
the inertia of some huge industrial aggregations that might otherwise be sluggish.”).
103. Khan, supra note 99, at 827 (quoting Gary Becker, Reforming the Patent System Toward a
Minimalist System-Becker, BECKER-POSNER BLOG (Sept. 30, 2012), https://www.becker-posnerblog.com/2012/09/reforming-the-patent-system-toward-a-minimalist-system-becker.html).
104. See Om Malik, In Silicon Valley Now, It’s Almost Always Winner Takes All, NEW YORKER (Dec.
30, 2015) (“Most competition in Silicon Valley now heads toward there being one monopolistic winner.”),
https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/in-silicon-valley-now-its-almost-always-winnertakes-all.
105. See Ted Sichelman & Sean O’Connor, Patents as Promoters of Competition: The Guild Origins
of Patent Law in the Venetian Republic, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1267, 1279 (2012) (“The adoption of the
patent system in Venice allowed in many senses for a ‘democratization’ of invention, diminishing the
power of guilds and increasing the power of independent inventors.”) (citing KHAN, supra note 43).
106. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
107. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
108. See, e.g., id. at 151 (“[T]he ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and
technologies into the public domain through disclosure.”); Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 486 (showing concern
for “[s]maller companies” and the “innovative entrepreneur with limited resources” in discussing the
interaction between trade secret law and patent law).
109. Jonathan M. Barnett, Is Intellectual Property Trivial?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 1729 (2009).
110. Barnett, supra note 95, at 43.
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the far smaller costs borne by any second-mover entrant.”111 An additional factor
might be the relative lack of alternative (non-patent) means of investment protection
for pharmaceutical incumbents.
There is thus reason to think that “small, specialized technology companies
are especially reliant on IP rights because, compared to larger companies, they have
fewer ways to capitalize on research and development investments.”112 Although
there are certainly other factors at play, the general weakening of the patent system
over the past decade or so,113 has coincided with an increase in the concentration of
markets.114 Moreover, some of the recent changes to patent law, such as the move to
first-to-file as opposed to first to invent, may provide advantages to larger entities
who tend to be less constrained in their ability to bear the costs of filing for patents.115
Programs at the USPTO to reduce fees and provide pro bono representation for
smaller entity patent filers may help to offset such costs, and should be
encouraged.116
B. Market Concentration and Individual Autonomy
Given that patents may tend to reduce concentration in certain technology
markets, this section considers the relationship between market concentration and
autonomy. A precondition for personal autonomy is that one must have a sufficient
number of options to choose among for the choice to be meaningful.117 By facilitating
111. Id. at 32.
112. MERGES, supra note 3, at 212. See generally Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized
Supply Firms, Property Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451 (2004); Robert P.
Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1477 (2005).
113. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (making it more difficult for
patentees to obtain a permanent injunction upon winning an infringement lawsuit); Clark D. Asay,
Patenting Elasticities, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 41 (2017) (“Over the last decade in particular, patent law has
experienced some of the most far-reaching changes in some sixty years.”); Peter Lee, The Supreme
Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1422 (2016) (“In many ways, the Supreme Court’s
recent decisions have reined in patent rights that had become quite expansive under Federal Circuit
jurisprudence.”).
114. See, e.g., Grullon et al., supra note 98, at 2 (“In real terms, the average publicly-traded firm is
three times larger today than it was twenty years ago. Lax enforcement of antitrust regulations and
increasing technological barriers to entry appear to be important factors behind this trend. Overall, our
findings suggest that the nature of US product markets has undergone a structural shift that has weakened
competition.”).
115. See David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? The America Invents Act
and Individual Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REV. 517, 521 (2013); Asay, supra note 113, at 55 (“The worry
with the AIA’s new priority rules is that large companies will often receive patents—even when resourceconstrained parties were the first to invent—simply because the larger companies’ superior resources
enable them to file patent applications more quickly.”).
116. See Lee, supra note 5, at 341; Osborn et al., supra note 29, at 1247 (proposing an increase in
maintenance fees, but maintaining reduced fees for small and micro entities, so as to benefit individual
inventors and small businesses).
117. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 374 (1986); see also 2 JOHN FINNIS, INTENTION
AND IDENTITY: COLLECTED ESSAYS 9–10 (2011) (“[I]f the substance is not merely organically
developing, as animals do, but has self-mastery that is entailed by being able to make free choices, choices
made and carried out not by one’s being acted upon but on one’s own initiative and intention and
responsibility, then we have that more special and perfect kind of substance that we call a person.”).
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a less concentrated, more diverse marketplace of firms, a functional patent system
could increase autonomy by giving technology sector employees more possible
places to work or more choice, as has been observed:
In an industry with many employers, a worker looking for a job has a variety
of prospects. If one employer is a bad fit, a worker might find a better spot
somewhere else. Someone who feels unappreciated can look elsewhere. This kind of
diversity is a meaningful component of freedom in modern society. When industries
become consolidated, individual freedom is diminished.118
A more diffuse marketplace, by allowing citizens more opportunity to
pursue their interests, with less pressure to conform to the demands of a few large
potential employers, may thus foster a more innovative society, thereby promoting
progress in science and the useful arts.119 The desirability of employee mobility in
terms of promoting autonomy may also provide another reason for restrictions on the
enforceability of non-compete agreements.120
Patents probably do not do much, if anything, to protect the autonomy of
the poor,121 and this essay is certainly not meant to suggest that the patent system is
some sort of elixir to all that ails our society. But by reducing market concentration,
a functional patent system may promote and protect the individual autonomy of parts
of the middle classes, employees in the technology sector, which matters in part
because recruitment (or destruction) of the middle classes is an important if not
essential condition for fascism to take hold.122 And the technology sector is not a
trivial part of the U.S. economy, by one measure, the software industry alone
accounted for 2.6 percent of U.S. GDP in 2012, and 2.2 percent of U.S. jobs in
2014.123 By helping to maintain a less concentrated labor market, an effective patent

118. Carl T. Bogus, The New Road to Serfdom: The Curse of Bigness and the Failure of Antitrust, 49
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 10 (2015).
119. Cf. BERTRAND RUSSELL, The Role of Individuality, in AUTHORITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 37
(1949) (“[A] community needs, if it is to prosper, a certain number of individuals who do not wholly
conform to the general type. Practically all progress, artistic, moral, and intellectual, has depended upon
such individuals. . . . “).
120. Cf. Bruce Fallick et al., Job Hopping in Silicon Valley: Some Evidence Concerning the MicroFoundations of a High Technology Cluster Abstract (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
11710, 2005) (“Outside of California, employers can use non-compete agreements to inhibit mobility, but
these agreements are unenforceable in California. Using new data on labor mobility we find higher rates
of job-hopping for college-educated men in Silicon Valley’s computer industry than in computer clusters
located out of the state.”); Fallick et al., supra, at 20 (“[F]requent job-hopping facilitates the rapid
reallocation of resources towards firms with the best innovations.”).
121. But see KHAN, supra note 43, at 106 (“[I]nventive activity also would increase the welfare of all
citizens regardless of social class.”).
122. See PAXTON, supra note 16, at 210 (“In Lipset’s formulation, fascism is an ‘extremism of the
center’ based on the rage of once-independent shopkeepers, artisans, peasants, and other members of the
‘old’ middle classes now squeezed between better-organized industrial workers and big businessmen, and
losing out in rapid social and economic change.” (quoting SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN,
127–182 (Anchor Books ed. 1963))).
123. ROBERT J. SHAPIRO, THE U.S. SOFTWARE INDUSTRY AS AN ENGINE FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH
AND EMPLOYMENT 2 (2014).
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system may prevent the depression of wages and thereby protect and reinforce
important parts of the middle class.124
A less concentrated marketplace also increases the number of individuals
who have top-level leadership positions, furthering individual autonomy in this way
as well, for “[e]very time an independent firm is swallowed by a corporate behemoth,
top executives—the chief executive, operating, and financial officers; the general
counsel; division and department heads; and so on—suffer demotions in authority
and self-image.”125 In other words, “someone who was previously a chief executive
officer and captain of his or her ship became a mere member of the crew in a
corporate bureaucracy.”126 As Woodrow Wilson put it, “when you are the servant of
a corporation,” and “have in no instance access to the men who are really determining
the policy of the corporation . . . [y]our individuality is swallowed up in the
individuality and purpose of a great organization.”127 A less concentrated market
with a larger number of smaller firms provides a degree of autonomy by allowing
more people to be (or have more access to) those top executives who are determining
the policy of the corporation.
C. National Vertical Collectivism
The form of market concentration that has advanced under neoliberalism,128
can also increase cynicism about democracy when behemoths leverage their vast
economic power to influence the State and benefit from corporate welfare and rent
seeking.129 Robert Reich points out that it is “perhaps no accident that those who
argue most vehemently on behalf of an immutable and rational ‘free market’ and

124. José Azar et al., Labor Market Concentration 1 (Dec. 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with The New Mexico Law Review) (“[W]e find that labor market concentration in the average market is
high, and higher concentration is associated with significantly lower posted wages. Given high
concentration, mergers have the potential to significantly increase labor market power.”).
125. Bogus, supra note 118, at 9–10.
126. Id. at 2.
127. WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM: A CALL FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF THE GENEROUS
ENERGIES OF A PEOPLE 5–6 (1913); see also Harry First, Woodstock Antitrust, ANTITRUST CHRON. at 57,
58 (Apr. 2018) (discussing the “fear that powerful institutions —government and business — had grown
too large and threatened personal freedom,” that is, “the freedom to make personal choices not controlled
by big institutions.”).
128. See David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism 77 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1 (2014) (“‘Neoliberalism’ refers to the revival of the doctrines of classical economic
liberalism, also called laissez-faire, in politics, ideas, and law. These revived doctrines have taken new
form in new settings: the ‘neo-’ means not just that they are back, but that they are also different, a new
generation of arguments.”).
129. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 470 (2010) (“A Government captured by corporate
interests, [citizens] may come to believe, will be neither responsive to their needs nor willing to give their
views a fair hearing. The predictable result is cynicism and disenchantment. . . . “) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Bogus, supra note, 118 at 12 (“Perhaps the greatest problem resulting from
gigantic corporate size and high industry concentration is the political power of corporations.”); Cedric E.
Dawkins, Corporate Welfare, Corporate Citizenship, and the Question of Accountability, 41 BUS. &
SOC’Y 269, 282–83 (2002) (determining that larger companies are significantly more likely to receive
corporate welfare).
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against government ‘intrusion’ are often the same people who exert disproportionate
influence over the market mechanism.”130
A highly concentrated or monopolized market would also tend to be more
susceptible to capture by or merger with the State. Indeed, the Weimar Republic
German economy was highly concentrated when fascism took hold,131 it had no
antitrust law and “the historical record suggests that the presence of a highly
concentrated industrial sector facilitated Hitler’s rapid consolidation of political
control in Germany during the mid-1930s.”132 As Milton Friedman has put it: “Let
both economic and political power be in the same hands and the only protection of
political freedom is the good will of those in power—a frail recourse particularly in
view of the corrupting influence of power and the talents that make for political
survival.”133 If large corporations become so powerful as to effectively capture the
State, Freidman’s observation may counsel in favor of structuring private law in
ways that tend to restrain (rather than augment) the power of large corporations.134
By weakening or reconfiguring the state to serve the interests of wealthy private
market actors, neoliberalism’s agenda moves us toward this sort of inversion.135
The neoliberal program has also involved a deliberate and troubling attempt
to shape the American mind,136 in ways that make the American people more
130. ROBERT REICH, SAVING CAPITALISM: FOR THE MANY, NOT THE FEW 11 (2015).
131. See JEREMY LEAMAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WEST GERMANY, 1945–85: AN
INTRODUCTION 50–51 (1988) (“Despite attempts at legal control in the Weimar Republic, Germany
remained the ‘land of cartels’, of price-fixing and monopoly power. . . . Under ‘national socialism’,
private monopoly power was the main organisational principle within each branch of the economy, where
‘mandatory cartelisation’ subordinated smaller agents of production to the authority of dominant firms in
each branch. . . . “); MARK STEINER, ECONOMICS IN ANTITRUST POLICY: FREEDOM TO COMPETE VS.
FREEDOM TO CONTRACT 21 (2007) (“By 1905, there were 385 cartels involving [12,000] firms, and the
number increased steadily, reaching [1,500] cartels in 1923, and climbing further to [3,000] or [4,000] by
the end of the Weimar Republic in 1933.”).
132. Crane, supra note 14, at 15. “Prior to reconstruction under the Allies, Germany had no antitrust
law—at least none that would be recognizable under contemporary global standards.” Id. at 16.
133. FRIEDMAN, supra note 59, at 14; see also RUSSELL, supra note 32, at 76 (explaining that “[h]uge
organizations, both political and economic,” ought “to leave as large a share of control as possible in the
hands of individuals and small groups,” and “[i]f this is not done, the men at the head of these vast
organizations will infallibly become tyrannous through the habit of excessive power, and will in time
interfere in ways that crush out individual initiative”).
134. Cf. BERTRAND RUSSELL, FREE THOUGHT AND OFFICIAL PROPAGANDA 43–44 (photo. reprt.
1974) (1922) (“The growth of monopolies is introducing in America many of the evils associated with
state socialism as it has existed in Russia. From the standpoint of liberty, it makes no difference to a man
whether his only possible employer is the State or a trust.”); Peter S. Menell, 2014: Brand Totalitarianism,
47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 787 (2014).
135. See Schlag, supra note 9, at 11 (footnote omitted) (“Neoliberalism involves the reconfiguration
of the state to service the various interests of powerful market actors in civil society. It is a kind of
inversion in which various actors in civil society refashion the state in their own image, idioms, modes of
management.”).
136. See, e.g., Lewis F. Powell, Jr., The Powell Memorandum: Attack on American Free Enterprise
System, SCHOLARLY COMMONS, 21 (Aug. 23, 1971), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=powellmemo (“The national television networks should be
monitored in the same way that textbooks should be kept under constant surveillance.”); Schlag, supra
note 9, at 63 (“Justice Powell wants to intervene in the culture industry–to win hearts and minds by
deliberate intervention in and capture of public institutions.”).
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subservient to corporate power, and also potentially more amenable to authoritarian
or hierarchical societal organization.137 Professor Schlag describes neoliberalism as
having matured into “an effort to fashion the individual liberal subject as a particular
kind of self—one disciplined for market governance and market functions,” by
refashioning moral, cultural, and political discourse “in instrumentalized market
terms,” such that “community becomes networking,” “knowledge becomes
expertise,” and “scholars become thought-leaders.”138 As Henry Giroux puts it,
“shaping the neoliberal framing of public and higher education is a corporate-based
ideology,” where there is little talk of “educating students as critical citizens rather
than potential employees of Walmart.”139 This trend away from any thoughtful form
of civic discourse is disturbing, as Hannah Arendt recalls that “[n]othing proved
easier to destroy than the privacy and private morality of people who thought of
nothing but safeguarding their private lives.”140
Although the competitive ethos of neoliberalism might facially seem to
promote individuality, there is a distinction between “the psychological concept of
vertical individualism (VI) [which] values competition and outperforming others,”
and “horizontal individualism (HI) [which] characterizes the desire to be unique and
different from equal others.”141 The American neoliberal form of competitive
individualism is far more vertical than horizontal.142 While both forms of
individualism may tend to work against pure fascism, (as they are both somewhat
inconsistent with the concept of a national collective Volk), vertical (or competitive)
individualism is more compatible with authoritarianism in general.143
A diverse marketplace of technology firms with varying cultures may tend
to cultivate a more horizontal individualism, fostering differences by allowing
employees more opportunity to find the right fit.144 Conversely, when individuals

137. Cf. EHRENREICH, supra note 18, at 44 (describing “an ideological force in American culture . . .
that encourages us to deny reality, submit cheerfully to misfortune, and blame only ourselves for our
fate”); STANLEY, supra note 20, at 7 (“[I]nequality tends to lead to epistemic barriers to the acquisition of
knowledge, ones that imperil democracy.”).
138. Schlag, supra note 9, at 63–64; see also HENRY A. GIROUX, NEOLIBERALISM’S WAR ON HIGHER
EDUCATION 87 (2014) (“Not only does neoliberalism undermine civic education and public values as well
as confuse education with training, it also treats knowledge as a product. . . . “); John Mixon, Neoclassical
Economics and the Erosion of Middle-Class Values: An Explanation of Economic Collapse, 24 NOTRE
DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 327 (2010).
139. GIROUX, supra note 138, at 137; see also WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS 10 (Zone Books
Near Future Series, No. 1, 2015) (“[T]oday’s homo oeconomicus is an intensely constructed and governed
bit of human capital tasked with improving and leveraging its competitive positioning and with enhancing
its (monetary and nonmonetary) portfolio value across all of its endeavors and venues.”).
140. ARENDT, supra note 12, at 338.
141. Kemmelmeier et al., supra note 8, at 312.
142. See Theodore M. Singelis et al., Horizontal and Vertical Dimensions of Individualism and
Collectivism: A Theoretical and Measurement Refinement, 29 CROSS-CULTURAL RES. 240, 244 (1995)
(“Some individualists (e.g., Americans) link self-reliance with competition; others do not.”).
143. Kemmelmeier et al., supra note 8, at 312 (citation omitted) (“[T]here is considerable evidence
that authoritarians prefer competition to cooperation and believe in natural hierarchies and the ‘survival
of the fittest.’”).
144. Cf. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 67 (Alburey Castell ed., Harlan Davidson, Inc. 1947) (1859)
(“Human beings are not like sheep; and even sheep are not undistinguishably alike.”).
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cannot find belonging in a community, they may be more susceptible to extreme
nationalism, identifying with a collectivist and nationalistic State.145 In this regard,
going too far in the direction of individual isolation could be problematic and make
a society more susceptible to fascism.146 The desirable middle ground is to foster an
environment with a variety of diverse communities (with corporations being one
aspect) where individuals have some autonomy and choice as to which communities
they associate with.147 This would seem to allow individuals more opportunity to
productively cultivate their lives and selves in diverse ways, instead of by identifying
with an ultranationalistic State or Volk.
Fascism constructs its ideology and program opportunistically,148 and an
American variant of fascism might attempt to take advantage of and integrate the
prevailing neoliberal ethos of vertical individualism; it could perhaps look something
like a nationwide corporation (or consolidated group of large corporations), where
citizens look something like at will employees.149 A citizen who refuses to fall in line
could be “fired” and for example denied healthcare, with nowhere else to turn.
Citizens would then have no choice but to obey the national or corporate authorities
– which due to market concentration coupled with neoliberal corruption, may be
effectively one and the same.
Citizens in such a society might be characterized by a vertical collectivism,
where “the individual sees the self as an aspect of an in-group, but the members of
the in-group are different from each other, some having more status than others,” and

145. Cf. GRIFFIN, supra note 53, at 188 (“In the case of fascism, its core myth of the regenerated
national community led by a revolutionary elite calls a priori for an act of identification, a neurologically
based mischannelling of the human drive for self-transcendence.”); FRANZ NEUMANN, Notes on the
Theory of Dictatorship, in THE DEMOCRATIC AND THE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 233, 244–45 (Herbert
Marcuse ed.,1957) (describing “totalitarian social controls,” as including the “atomization and isolation
of the individual, which involves . . . the imposition of huge and undifferentiated mass organizations
which leave the individual isolated and more easily manipulable”).
146. Cf. ARENDT, supra note 12, at 317 (“[T]he masses grew out of the fragments of a highly atomized
society whose competitive structures and concomitant loneliness of the individual had been held in check
only through membership in a class.”); PAXTON, supra note 16, at 50 (“[T]hose already deeply engaged,
from generation to generation, in the rich subculture of socialism, with its clubs, newspapers, unions, and
rallies, were simply not available for another loyalty.”).
147. Cf. RUSSELL, supra note 119, at 59 (“Where art has flourished in the past it has flourished as a
rule amongst small communities which had rivals among their neighbors, such as the Greek City States,
the little Principalities of the Italian Renaissance, and the petty Courts of German eighteenth-century
rulers.”).
148. See Schlag, supra note 9, at 11 n.20; see also PAXTON, supra note 16, at 10 (explaining that early
on, “fascist movements flaunted their contempt for bourgeois values and for those who wanted only ‘to
earn money,’” and “attacked ‘international finance capitalism,’” though once in power “they did nothing
to carry out these anticapitalist threats”); RIEMEN, supra note 8, at 81–82 (“[F]ascism would take on
different forms in different countries because there were no ideas and no single universal value underlying
fascism’s credo. . . . [T]he sole reason for their existence was power for power’s sake. . . . “).
149. Cf. Ewan McGaughey, Fascism-Lite in America (or the Social Ideal of Donald Trump), 7 BRIT.
J. OF AM. LEGAL STUD. 291, 310 (2018) (“Politically, Trump’s strong businessman image is consistent
with key elements of fascist behavior.”).
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“sacrificing for the in-group is an important aspect of this pattern.”150 This vertical
collectivism seems to fairly describe “in-groups” such as the employees of a
corporation, but in fascism, the “in-group” is the State or the Volk, so if the State
were to begin to look like one large corporation, then we would seem, on a national
level, to be shifting from vertical individualism to vertical collectivism, and trending
towards fascism.151 Fascism is characterized in part by “the right of the chosen people
to dominate others without restraint from any kind of human or divine law, right
being decided by the sole criterion of the group’s prowess within a Darwinian
struggle.”152 Communism is theoretically characterized by a horizontal collectivism,
as opposed to fascism’s vertical collectivism, but both are collectivist on a national
and totalitarian level.153
While “find another job” might be an appropriate response to a disobedient
employee, “find another country” is not an appropriate state response to a peacefully
dissenting citizen.154 The actions of the (liberal democratic) state “must respect
democracy and the rule of law,” though the “persons and practices comprising civil
society” are not necessarily required to “observe those commitments in their dealings
with each other.”155 Corporations fairly demand a certain degree of conformity, and
“Americans can be fired for [almost] anything, such as failing to generate positive
vibes.”156 This is relatively unproblematic so long as association with the corporation

150. Singelis, supra note 142; see also ALEXANDER J. DE GRAND, FASCIST ITALY AND NAZI
GERMANY 47 (2d ed. 2004) (ebook) (explaining that fascist economic policies generally protect
inequality).
151. Cf. HOWARD J. WIARDA, CORPORATISM AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS 12 (1997) (“[I]n the 1920s
and 1930s such fascists and semifascists as Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in Germany, Franco in Spain, and
Salazar in Portugal used, in part, a corporatist system of organizing their economies and political
systems.”).
152. PAXTON, supra note 16, at 220.
153. See Singelis, supra note 142, at 246 (“Thus extreme H-C is the pattern of theoretical
communism. . . . Extreme V-C is the case of Nazi Germany. . . . “). In this regard, it is pertinent to note
that China did not have a patent law while deeply in the grips of communism. See, e.g., Bonan Lin et al.,
Overview of Chinese Patent Law 2 (Oct. 19–22, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with The New
Mexico Law Review) (“The leaders of the country had never been bothered by the question of whether to
have a patent system or not in China until the end of the ‘Culture Revolution’. Eventually, the first patent
legislation was initiated by the end of the 1970’s.”).
154. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“[N]o official, high
or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion
or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”); cf. FRIEDMAN, supra note 59, at 11 (“The
state exists to protect individuals from coercion by other individuals or groups and to widen the range
within which individuals can exercise their freedom; it is purely instrumental and has no significance in
and of itself. . . . Nations may be convenient administrative units; nationalism is an alien creed.”); Sean
Sullivan,
Trump
slams
Colin
Kaepernick,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
29,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/08/29/trump-slams-colin-kaepernickmaybe-he-should-find-a-country-that-works-better-for-him/?utm_term=.53a93d859cf0 (when an NFL
quarterback, as a political statement against oppression, refused to stand during the national anthem, then
candidate Donald Trump’s response was, “Maybe he should find a country that works better for him”).
155. Schlag, supra note 9, at 19.
156. EHRENREICH, supra note 18, at 54.
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is voluntary in that there are a sufficient variety of corporations to choose from.157
But when the market is highly concentrated, the few consolidated employers have
more power to impose conformity and obedience in whatever ways they see fit. As
Joseph Raz explains, it is “not number but variety” that matters, as a “choice between
hundreds of identical and identically situated houses is no choice, compared with a
choice between a town flat and a suburban house, for example.”158 To the extent that
a functional patent system facilitates market entry, working against market
concentration and increasing the variety of options for technology sector employees,
it may tend to work against fascism by promoting a more horizontal form of
individualism.
CONCLUSION
The promotion of individual autonomy provides a different and potentially
important lens through which to view the patent system. Viewing the patent system
in this way allows us to appreciate certain under-recognized benefits of the patent
system and suggests potential tweaks to further accentuate such benefits.
Philosophically, by encouraging diverse non-obvious innovative thinking, the patent
system may tend to make certain sectors of the population less susceptible to the
group conformity and authoritarian submission required under oppressive
authoritarian or fascist regimes. The non-obviousness standard serves to ensure that
only true inventions receive patents, and a stricter standard may desirably encourage
inventors to aim for major innovative breakthroughs rather than mere marginal
improvements over the prior art. It is also important that the patent system retain its
technological objectivity and not become a tool for propaganda. Economically, by
reducing market concentration in certain technology sectors, the patent system may
promote individual autonomy by giving employees more choice as to where to work,
and more opportunity to potentially influence the culture and direction of their
organizations. A less concentrated market is also less susceptible to capture by, or
merger with, the State. Recognizing reduced market concentration as a benefit of the
patent system suggests that we may want to expand patent programs designed to
benefit startups and smaller entities, and provides a counter to arguments for
weakening the patent system in certain sectors that have been advanced from an
economic efficiency perspective.
This essay is not meant to serve as the last word on these issues, but rather
to stimulate discussion, and has endeavored to demonstrate how the effects of private
law on individual autonomy, market concentration, and our susceptibility to
oppressive regimes, may be worthy of further inquiry.

157. See RAZ, supra note 117, at 373 (“[T]o be autonomous a person must not only be given a choice
but he must be given an adequate range of choices.”).
158. Id. at 375.

